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Has science got a basic principle? 
(Epistemological approach to science: Novelties and problems 
brought by evolution of epistemological thought to the manner the 






The subject of this paper will be the attempts to find a basic principle 
of science from different philosophers of science. These resulted into 
novelties as well as new problems of perception, interpretation and 
approach to science, and its development. 
Although the science which constitutes the most obvious evidence of 
increased human knowledge, turned out to be a very complex 
phenomenon with many different challenges to be understood and 
explained, which is expressed through different theories of philosophy 
of science, which also express different approaches, but at the same 
time reflect its evolution. 
The novelties as well as epistemological problems, roughly speaking, 
can be summarized as follows: 
(i) the formulation of the basic principle of science – the principle of 
verifiability,  
(ii) the falsification as a guiding principle of science,  
(iii) the paradigms and their shift as main principle of development of 
science; and 
(iv) the controversial developments after Kuhn 
Yet, despite the success, there is still no epistemological theory, which 
would give answers to questions: whether there is any rational 
explanation of how the community of scientists sets, culminating in 
moments of scientific development, to change the paradigms. 
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Introduction 
 
The question above (Has science got a basic principle?) is not selected 
to provoke a debate, but to express a challenge that is yet very sharp, 
and which has provoked many prominent epistemologists. Such a 
question would not even be raised in the past: it represented a well-
known problem. It was clear and self-explanatory. One would just 
need to find and formulate such a principle. 
The search of the basic principle of science was driven by the need 
to understand the fascinating success of natural sciences, as well as to 
make viable rational explanation of knowledge production, its growth 
and advancement, including the development of science in the past, at 
present and in the future. A rational explanation, to be valid, was 
believed had to be supported by a basic principle. In this sense, the 
question of whether a basic principle of science is there; was 
equivalent to question whether science is rational, or if scientific 
activity can be explained rationally. 
This paper will pose the main efforts in providing responses to the 
above question, also whether science has a basic principle. The pivot 
of this treatise will be the most known theories which, explicitly or 
implicitly, resulted with the construction of such a principle. Those 
theories featured different approaches and mutual criticism, through 
which the evolution of epistemological thought flowed: bringing the 
conceptual innovation, which expressed deepening of understanding 
and explaining the science. 
The contributions of epistemologists looking for a basic principle 
of science can be summarized in four different efforts: (i) the 
formulation of the basic principle of science –the principle of 
verifiability, (ii) the falsification as the guiding principle of science, 
(iii) the paradigms and their shift as main principle of the 
development of the science; and (iv) the controversial developments 
after Kuhn. 
Elaboration will be done through adduction of theoretical 
formulations of basic principle, the belief of how it operated and how 
it could explain the success of scientific development historically and 
currently, as well as mutual criticism in hot topics, to sensitize 
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significance, value, necessity and possibility of the existence or not of 
governing and regulating such a principle of science2. 
 
Formulation of the basic principle of science – verifiabilityand 
new problems 
 
The verification principle expresses the (neo) positivists3 theoretical 
view points of science, the core of which presents the conviction that 
the intent of science is verification of assertion. This meant that all the 
success of science depended on and is fraught with achieving the 
target – stating the truth of the assertion. 
In the spirit of philosophical thought for centuries associated with 
explanations of science and synthesizing them, the (neo) positivists 
aimed at finding the basic principle of science whereby it functioned 
as a whole, as well as to explain how the growth of scientific 
knowledge took place historically and currently, showing clearly the 
guiding principle and procedural aspect of scientific research. 
Such basic principle is known as principle of verifiability, as Alfred 
Ayer concludes: 
"We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, 
if, and only if, e knows how to verify the proposition which it 
purports to express - that is, if he knows what observations would 
lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being 
true, or reject it as being "4. 
The outcome of the confrontation with experience ascertains the 
verity of the sentence. 
                                                          
2 It sounds like the Kantian formulation of the problem (Imanuel Kant, 
“Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological Ideas”, in The 
Critique of Pure Reason. Section, translated into English by F. Max Müller, 
Second edition, revised, London,The MacMillan Company, 1922, p. 413), and 
so it is, because nearly so believed in the role of such a principle 
epistemologists who tried to formulate it. 
3Also known as the logical positivists, or Wiennerkretz (County of Vienna). 
4Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz LTD, London, 1936, 
p. 19-20. 
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This principle worked through the method by which scientists led 
research, as it, for example, was formulated by the founder of 
positivism: from observing to predict, on purpose of studying that is 
stable and relate into the future5. This is known as inductive method. 
In other words, scientific theories should stem from observations, 
should express that was stable in those observations, and from these 
to glean valuable predictions for the future. 
The principle of verifiability and method of scientific research 
consisted in that the fate of theory depended on the outcome by facing 
with experience, which means that the assertion could be falsified by 
experience and, in such case, it should be cast as false, or rather 
verified, meaning that it was confirmed by experience and then joins 
the corpus of scientifically proven sentences. Every such success 
increased scientific knowledge, an increase which was linearly and 
cumulatively, in a continuous process. So it seemed that the entire 
scientific activity was a known procedure but completely rational, in 
as much as it was known how everything had to be done and what 
based on outcomes had to be the evaluation of a scientific theory. The 
principle of verifiability and the implemented method were universal 
norms according to which developed the science, as well as explained 
the success of the growth of scientific knowledge. 
The principle of verifiability seemed really to work, according to 
its conceptual premise. The (neo) positivists concerned the fact or the 
experience or the reality as something given and pure, independent of 
theory and unaffected by it, and served as a test stone to all scientific 
theories. This view on science, when just it emerged from 
Wiennerkretz, was then found wide support in philosophical and 
scientific circles. The reason seems to be that (neo)positivists through 
the principle of verifiability, in a way, could explain the success and 
growth of scientific knowledge as it appeared, and such a view 
                                                          
5Auguste Comte, Om positivismen, translated into Swedish by Otto 
Manheimer, Surtre, Sweden: Bokförlaget Korpen, printed at MINAB, 1979, 
p. 19-20 
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seemed to be supported by almost any everyday achievements of 
empirical science. 
That’s why Karl Popper’s criticism addressed to (neo) positivists 
fell on deaf ears at that time and have no effect. Popper enunciates the 
argument that (i) scientific theories cannot be verified as claimed by 
(neo)positivists. He stressed that (ii) the experience (also the given, the 
fact) was affected by the theory and it could be understood in the light 
of theory6, also it was not so pure as believed by (neo) positivists. 
Another criticism was that (iii) the elimination of metaphysics from 
scientific theories leads to the elimination of natural sciences itself7, as 
each theory contained generalizations, which could not be tested 
empirically, hence did not meet the (neo)positivists’ empirical criteria. 
He criticized (iv) the inductive method too, as a procedure that if 
followed rigorously will lead to an infinite regress, therefore it was 
not a scientific method. 
Popper in (iii) in principle has right; in (i) seem that he has not, 
since Imre Lakatos notes that most of the tests de facto end with 
confirmation. The (ii) argument had support but was ignored by 
(neo)positivists. In (iv) had somewhat right Popper, but he wasn’t 
correct when he tried to eliminate it from science or considered it as 
unscientific one, and so to give connotation to the (neo) positivists 
explanation of science as non-rational. 
While the (neo)positivists could explain the increase of knowledge 
and scientific progress in stable periods, they met a crucial problem: 
could not explain periods of thorough transformations, namely the 
change of existing macro-theory (corpus scientific assertions) with a 
new one. Despite efforts, the (neo)positivists explanation could not 
yield sustainable without falling into contradiction with its principle 
of verification: how could a corpus of verified statements be 
disproved? 
 
                                                          
6Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London and New York, 
Routledge classics, 2003, p. 90, f. *3. Referred as LSD. 
7 ibid., p. 13. 
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Falsification as guiding principle of science and its 
insufficiency 
 
Popper seems to have understood how to solve the main problem that 
could not (neo) positivist solve, also to explain scientific thorough 
transformations that had occurred and occur occasionally according to 
the story of science. In this aspect focused his view of philosophy of 
science: in key moments of thorough transformations in science, with 
the conviction that they were the only ones that mattered for science, 
its development and growth of scientific knowledge. 
But to do this, he had to deal and priory to solve issues with (neo) 
positivists. In this battle he harshly criticized and argued against the 
principle of verifiability claiming openly to completely defeat it as an 
inadequate point of view for the mission set to itself, failing precisely 
in what it aimed: to explain the progress of science8. 
Contrary to (neo) positivists, Popper attempted to rehabilitate the 
metaphysics. There are barren metaphysics that is to say cannot be 
transformed into scientific theory, but there are also fruitful 
metaphysics which can be transformed into a scientific research 
program9. At this point Popper was right, even though his view could 
not be understood by (neo) positivists. 
Popper approach is exactly the other side of verification: he 
constructed a basic principle and implemented a method too, with the 
same claims as the only scientific one. In other words, it can be said 
Popper believed that scientific research failed not if it resulted in the 
falsification of a scientific theory. Instead it was a success, such one of 
magnitude larger than the one claimed by (neo)positivist. 
The principle of falsification highlights that a theory to be accepted 
as a scientific hypothesis has to be testable and to contain potential 
falsifiers. Such can be "singular statements" or "basic statements" that 
                                                          
8 ibid., p. 3 – 34. 
9 ibid., p. xxiii, p. 16. Also in Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 183, f. 
3. 
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describe the event10. Every theory, according to Popper, excludes 
some events11,which are potentially its falsifiers. On this ground he 
writes that it is quite possible to argue from verity of singular to 
falsify a universal statement12. Also, when an assertion is a basic 
statement which contradicts the theory, or when the event which 
prohibits theory occurred, then this statement or this event falsifies 
the whole hypothesis13. 
To work, the principle needs a scientific method. Popper believed 
it was the deductive-nomological method14, which instructs a critical 
review, negative one15, with the open goal of finding possibility to 
refutation: to investigate the counter-facts to achieve falsification of 
hypothesis16. Obviously, the macro-theories showed often to be 
stubborn that experiments and tests usually lead to their provisional 
confirmation17, expressing that the theory resisted attempts of 
falsifying, rather than theory was verified. Thus, the fundamental 
difference with (neo) positivists, was that Popper believed and 
recommended that scientists should focus their efforts to falsify 
scientific theories, while the experimental confirmation considered by 
him as temporal. The principle of falsification and above method was 
believed as universal norms according to which the science 
developed, as well as explained the success of the growth of scientific 
knowledge. 
Through view of falsification Popper was able to explain what 
(neo)positivists could not: how macro-theories replaced. It happened 
when an existing theory was disproven, whereas new, competing 
theories strongly resisted to same attempts. Then, the decision about 
throwing the old theory in favour of the new one is taken by 
                                                          
10 Popper, op.cit., p. 66-67. 
11 ibid., p. 67. 
12 ibid., p. 19. 
13 ibid., p. 85. 
14 ibid., p. 6-7. 
15 ibid., p. 9. 
16Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutation, Routledge classics, London and New 
York, 2002, p. xv. 
17Popper, LSD, op.cit., p. 10, p. 264. 
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community of scientists: it was a methodological decision18, also 
according to the results of the methodological research. 
It is a methodological agreement of scientist what would be 
regarded as empirical statement: simply it is a convention19. Also, the 
fact is such one thanks to the agreement, and it is perceived so in 
accordance with the convention, meaning that it is not out there, as 
something pure given. Neither this empirical conception could save 
the Popper’s view of falsification. Ayer answered back: if experience 
can not verify a theory, it also can neither falsify it; simply, it either 
works equally in both cases, or does not work in either case20. 
Thus, it can be seen that in its own way Popper explained the 
(neo)positivists’ trouble, but focusing attention only on the 
momentum of scientific revolutions, he arrived at a position that is 
characterized as a permanent revolution, in the sense that the 
revolution happened or could happen at any time, permanently, 
buton the other side he left aside and paid not the attention to the 
intermediate aspect between two revolutions. 
This view of Popper as well as that of (neo)positivists explained, 
from the procedural perspective, the totality of the scientific process 
as a rational activity of scientists, in the sense that it was known the 
guidance and the research goals, what should be looked for and how 
to findit, to ascertain it and to replace the old theories with new ones. 
But if it been followed the falsificationism, Kuhn argues, then 
neither the scientific revolutions would happen as Popper claimed, 
since the new theory always is easier to be falsified than the old one 
which is already established and resisted tests, whilst the new one in 
its infancy has deficiency and needs complements. Therefore, even 
abstracting the above counter-effects, it manifests insufficiency to 
explain exactly what Popper had claimed to - the real causes that lead 
to the scientific revolution, and so even the whole development of 
science. 
 
                                                          
18 ibid., p. 32-34, p. 92. 
19 ibid., p. 88. 
20Ayer, op.cit., p. 24-25. 
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Paradigms and their change as main principle ofscientific 
development and the mystery of scientific revolutions 
 
Thomas Kuhn is the one who unveiled an explanation of the process 
of scientific development as a whole, describing almost all possible 
stages through which science goes in its evolutionary development. 
Kuhn argues that not only taken separately but even if verification 
and falsification were taken as a combination as verification-
falsification are insufficient, because the main aim of scientific 
research is not simply achieving the verification or falsification21, 
though in appearance they give such impression. 
Kuhn went further: he shook the grounds of any principle with 
universal validity, indicating that there is neither any such criterion or 
principle22, nor any methodological rule23 that could have such status, 
because there was no such one to support the science and could guide 
it or explain its successful development. This view generates from the 
thesis that the two competing paradigms are incommensurable24. 
Kuhn expresses a different point of view, the main principle being 
the paradigm25, to it and to scientific community the whole scientific 
development is related According to him the mature science began 
with the acceptance of a paradigm by the community of scientists. 
After the event, it is the paradigm which rules the science, namely the 
community; it determines the direction of the development as well as 
the scientific research. Paradigm promises success and achievements.  
Through the paradigm, as framework for macro-theory or system 
of theories, Kuhn explained many aspects of science: the role of the 
scientific community, the birth, development and extinction of 
scientific tradition, the role of scientist as researcher guiding by 
paradigm and related to it the scientific activity. The paradigm 
                                                          
21Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, translation into 
Albanian by Aleko Minga and Petrit Skende: Struktura e revolucioneve 
shkencore, Tirana- Peja, Dukagjini & CEU Press, 1977, p. 25, 205. 
22 ibid., p. 134, 233. 
23 ibid., p. 20. 
24 ibid., p. 21. 
25 ibid., p. 44, 77. 
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determined the reality, the experience and the fact, not the opposite, 
and then they can be calibrated, of course in support of paradigm26. 
As long as the paradigm shown effective, it directed the research in 
achieving success towards expected and sometimes unexpected 
knowledge usually in spirit of paradigm, that’s why it was common 
metaphysical, empirical and research ground of scientists, and almost 
no one contested it . The undertaken tests reflected effectiveness and 
skills of scientists27, as they dealt with concrete theory the success of 
which provide paradigms. 
The Science governed by a paradigm calls normal science28, which 
after a period of development seems inevitable to get absorbed, or 
increase anomalies which, if not resolved, cause crisis29. If it continues, 
loses the trust to existing paradigm, the community get split and 
encourage the creation of rival paradigms. All these could reach a 
point that culminates by replacing the paradigm: the new one take 
place of the old – the scientific community for this change decided.30 
This paradigm shift expresses the triumph of the scientific 
revolution31, extinguishing crisis, re-uniting the community, returning 
the stability and normal circumstances in scientific activity. At the 
same time, it changed radically the perceptions so that scientist 
seemed to work in a different world from earlier32. 
So, without doubt, Kuhn raised to a higher degree the 
understanding and explanation concerning the nature, operation and 
development of science, linking the process of cumulatively growth of 
knowledge with occasional revolutionary transformations as 
evolutionary nature of scientific development. Also he showed that 
during crises and revolutions there are different paradigms and 
                                                          
26 ibid., 46, 48-57. 
27 ibid., p. 61-62. 
28 ibid., p. 22, 29, 36, 39, 45-71. 
29 ibid., p. 117-128. 
30 ibid., p. 138. 
31 ibid., p.. 23. 
32 ibid., p. 189 
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competition between them (plurality)33, but after the revolution the 
science governs by a single paradigm (monism)34. 
At the same time, he pointed out other problems, deeper than 
previously known. For instance, the key moment of fundamental 
science turning, the scientific revolution – proved well that it happens, 
but failed to argue on what grounds it happens, that the only 
explanation was - scientists convert to the new paradigm. But the 
conversion is not sudden as claimed Kuhn, contrary it is a kind 
process with many different influences. 
Although Kuhn gave a great contribution to epistemology, he 
failed to solve Gordian knot. The decision making to change the 
paradigms, as the culminate moment in the scientific revolution, 
remained a mystery for which Kuhn gives no clear explanation. 
 
Controversial developments after Kuhn 
 
Up to date developments, currently available in most cases are called 
as postkuhnian, because they are direct reflection on Kuhn’s 
philosophy of science innovation. Most important are two of them 
with controversial direction, which contributions will be outlined 
here. 
On the one hand there was an attempt to solve the problems 
brought by Kuhn’s theory. Imre Lakatos formulates a basic principle 
in his concept of “The Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes”35, which intended to be valid inter-theoretically, also 
provide a criteria to evaluate every research programmes. As the title 
shows the methodology was incorporated into the scientific research 
programme36, and the principle was very liberal and flexible: the 
criterion of progress-degenerating37, which should show progressive 
                                                          
33 ibid., p. 120, 128. 
34 ibid., p. 29, 39. 
35 Imre Lakatos& Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 101 – 197. 
36 ibid., p. 132-133. 
37 ibid., p. 134. 
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or degrading state of a program and so helping the decision to 
abandon, respectively accept a research program. Unlike Kuhn and 
similar to (neo)positivists and Popper, Lakatos rejected the monistic 
character of science by claiming that its characteristic is plurality and 
competition between scientific programmes. In addition to internal 
development as well the external competition determinates the 
scientific development38. The progressive–degenerate criteria and 
methodological regulation intended to test the rational functionality 
of science, but as criticized by Kuhn39 and Feyerabend40, Lakatos fails 
to give a time limit when a theory should be considered as 
degenerated so that should be abandoned and accepted the new 
research programmes. 
On the other hand, there was an attempt to deepen the problems 
brought by Kuhn’s theory, presenting them as natural science and as 
typical to it. Paul Feyerabend41 rejected Lakatos and agreed with 
Kuhn, demystified and denied as counterproductive a basic principle 
like universal criteria and methodological rules. Instead he affirmed 
the plurality like Lakatos as characteristic in every stage of the 
development of science, and not like Kuhn who claimed plurality as 
characteristic only in times of crises and revolutions. He showed too 
that so well could function counter-rules, counter-induction, and 
anarchism versus rationality42. Instead of petrifying positions, he 
stated that the development was made through contacts and opens 
and free exchanges. However, Kuhn has opposed by reaffirming that 
such a development is characteristic only for periods of crisis and 
scientific revolutions, but not for post-revolution’s period or normal 
science when it is guided by a paradigm. 
                                                          
38 ibid., p. 155. 
39 ibid., p. 239. 
40 ibid., p. 215. 
41Paul Feyerabend, “Condolaton for the Specialist”, in  Lakatos& Musgrave, 
op.cit, pp. 197-230. 
42 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, translated into Swedish by Thomas 
Brante and Cecilia Hansson: Ned med metodologin,,  Lund: Arkiv, 2000, f.. 34-
37, 50-60, 219-227. 
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Postkuhniane efforts to date have shown some attempt of 
deepening in any given direction, making any modified version, 





As stated roughly in this essay, it is clear that in an attempt to 
discover a basic principle through which in a rational way could be 
explained how science works, that so successfully produces ever 
increasing and progress knowledge, the thought of epistemology, 
through various theories, has evolved. It revealed various problems, 
treated them and tried to give solutions, but other increasingly 
problems arose all the time, thus pushing as an impetus for further 
visionary changes. Currently the epistemology thoughts are in a 
limbo, when attempts on different aspects, ways and approaches 
without any significant achievement. So there is still no theory of 
philosophy of science which has given answers to questions: is there 
is any rational explanation about how the scientific community, in 
culminate moments of scientific development, decides to change the 
paradigms? Or scientific revolution really is a conversion? 
This lack of response, indicates that despite all allegations, science 
does not and cannot have any basic principle of universal validity to 
guide it, or in which science works and could be rationally explained, 
the development, success in producing and advancement of scientific 
knowledge43, although we see almost every day how new knowledge 
is achieved as well as advance increasingly the technique and 
technology. 
                                                          
43Hajdin Abazi. Investigations of rationalism in Philosophy of science. 
http://www.yumpu.com/sq/document/view/20450290/doctor-hajdin-
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Or perhaps epistemology has not yet managed to understand the 
underlying manner of science, namely principles, norms, rules and 
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